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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT  

## INFORMATION REPORT

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the Home Front

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25X1 1. Regardless of whether the Chinese Communists intend to start a foreign war they are indulging in energetic measures to prepare the nation for either offensive or defensive action. Examples of the measures taken are as follows:

a. Railways:

- (1) Survey and construction of the railway from Paotou via Nanking to Lanchow which was commenced in late 1950 is still continuing.
- (2) The extension of the Lunghai Railway from Tientsin to Lanchow is nearing completion.
- (3) A Sian-Chungking Railway is being built.
- (4) The Chungking-Chengtou Railway is now in use.

b. Censorship:

Censorship has obviously stiffened recently. Formerly ordinary mail from Peiping or Tientsin to Hong Kong took between seven and nine days. Now the fastest mail takes from eight to nine days and averages over ten days. Censored mail naturally arrives later than uncensored mail. According to mainland merchants in Hong Kong the inspection of mail and travelers is much more stringent than before. Especially noteworthy is the difficulty in procuring travel documents, which is impossible without giving proper reasons and shop guarantees.

c. General Security Measures:

In addition to the purge, census control in the large metropolitan areas is much stiffer. Previously a resident was required to report to the neighborhood police outpost if he planned to have overnight visitors; now he must report if the visitor is likely to remain in the house any length of time. A group of three or more talking in a public place attracts attention and generally leads to clandestine observation. This is true not only in large cities but also in the countryside of North and Northeast China.

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d. Stockpiling:

Large-scale Chinese Communist purchases of radio and general military supplies and cotton yarn as well as other commodities has forced the Hong Kong prices of these items up.

2. Based on Socialist theory, the Chinese Communist foreign policy demands their adherence to the Socialist bloc, especially to the Soviet Union as head of that bloc. Since national boundaries are still recognized, minor conflicts of interest between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets are inevitable; but on the large issues, especially foreign policy, they are completely united regardless of whether they appear so. There is no hope of changing this policy line unless special and tremendous outside pressures threaten the very existence of the Chinese Communists and thus bring about an internal change. The short term aims of the Chinese Communist foreign policy are: participating in the Japanese Peace Treaty, recognition by the United Nations, and recovery of Taiwan. These are initial steps which the Chinese Communists must take to stabilize the home front and further peaceful reconstruction. They do not mean that there is any possibility that an expansionist Communist policy in the Orient will be terminated upon the satisfaction of these aspirations. The long-term view is identical with the Soviets. However the possibility remains that this unity will be disrupted by obstructions during its implementation. For example at the outbreak of the Korean war there was no divergence between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets on policy and the Chinese Communists consequently agreed to intervene with an armed force. Now because of the terrific resistance they are encountering, the Chinese Communists are unwilling to proceed and desire the Soviets to take steps to get them off the hook.
3. Soviet control over Chinese Communists has not yet become as concrete as the Japanese puppet regime. However, the Soviets use their own men among the Chinese Communists, such as LIU Shao-chi and LI Li-san, to perform their missions without giving the impression of overt Soviet control.
4. The usual practice of the Chinese Communists before reaching a decision on policy presents sharp arguments within the Party. However, when the final decision is reached, either by vote or by a MAO ruling, all are required to respect the decision and no dissent or doubt is tolerated. Because of this difference between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party practice, it is less likely that factions will develop in the latter camp.

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